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1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the World Trade Organization' engendered a
flurry of scholarly excitement, much of which focused on the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms built into the organization's scheme. 2
The advent of the World Trade Organization also generated schol-
arly debate on the nature and future of the World Trade Organiza-
* Ronald Koenig Term Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania. A.B., Harvard University; J.D., LL.M.
(foreign and international law), Duke University.
1 The World Trade Organization came into existence on January 1, 1995. It
was the culmination of over seven years of multilateral trade negotiations known
as the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round constituted the most ambitious and
most complex trade negotiations ever undertaken. See Arthur Dunkel, 'Trade Poli-
cies for a Better Future' and the Uruguay Round, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER
FUTURE: THE "LEUTWILER" REPORT, THE GATT, AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1, 1 (1987)
(describing the Uruguay Round as "the most far-reaching, comprehensive and
significant multilateral trade negotiation ever undertaken"). For an excellent his-
tory of the Uruguay Round, see JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995).
2 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution:
Building a Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 111 (1992);
Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign
Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 161 (1996); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WFO Dispute Proce-
dures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
193 (1996); Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order
for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Mis-
fits: The GATT, the ICJ, & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043
(1994); David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade
Law in the United States, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 129 (1995); David W.
Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 11,
14-16 (1995); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Re-
form in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1994); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996); Mi-
chael K. Young, Book Review, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 160 (1996) (reviewing YuJI
IWASAWA, WTO NO FUNSO SHORI [The Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Or-
ganization]).
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tion. One such debate, concerning participation in the World
Trade Organization by nongovernmental parties ("NGOs"), was
published in an earlier volume of the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Economic Law.3 This essay continues that
debate.
The issue that initiated this debate was whether standing be-
fore World Trade Organization dispute settlement panels should
be extended to include nongovernment parties. Currently, only
member countries 4 of the World Trade Organization may appear
before such panels.5 In a provocative article published in the Duke
3 See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996); Philip M. Nichols,
Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model
and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996).
4 Any "separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of
its external commercial relations," such as Hong Kong or Gibraltar, may also be-
come a member of the World Trade Organization. Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations [World Trade Organization], Apr. 15, 1994, art.
XII(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [herein-
after WTO Agreement], 33 I.L.M. 13, 21 [hereinafter Charter]. This essay uses the
term country as a term of convenience that is intended to include all members of
the organization.
5 The primary organic document of the World Trade Organization is its char-
ter, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. See
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. Several
agreements are annexed to the Charter, including one which sets forth the proce-
dure for the settlement of disputes among members of the World Trade Organiza-
tion. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 112
(1994) [hereinafter Understanding]. The Dispute Settlement Body, composed of
all of the members of the World Trade Organization who choose to participate,
administers the settlement process. See id. para. 2.1. A member may bring a com-
plaint against another member for a number of reasons, the most common of
which is that an action by that member nullifies or impairs a benefit that is sup-
posed to accrue to the complaining member pursuant to one of the trade agree-
ments administered by the World Trade Organization. See id. para. 3.3. The
members must consult with one another, but if consultation does not resolve the
dispute, the complaining member may request that a panel hear its complaint. See
id. para. 4.3. The panel, consisting of three persons selected by the World Trade
Organization and agreed to by the parties, takes oral and written testimony from
the disputants and from other concerned members of the Organization. The panel
issues a report wherein it determines whether the complaint is justified. If so, it
recommends action to be taken by the World Trade Organization. See id. paras. 8-
16. Parties may appeal a panel report to an Appellate Body which sits in three-
person panels chosen from a standing group of seven persons. See id. para. 17.
The panel report, or the report of the Appellate Body, becomes final unless every
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/8
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Law Journal, Professor Richard Shell suggests that standing should
be expanded. His suggestion is part of a larger vision that he has
for the World Trade Organization, which he calls a "Trade Stake-
holders Model." 6 Specifically, the Trade Stakeholders Model
"seeks to break the monopoly of states on international dispute
resolution machinery and to extend the power to enforce interna-
tional legal norms beyond states to individuals."7 The Trade
Stakeholders Model also embraces "a vision of civic republican
'participatory legalism."' 8
Although I do not necessarily disagree with the concept that
the World Trade Organization should avail itself of the expertise of
"outside" persons and interest groups, I do have several concerns
with respect to expansion of standing, which I outlined in the first
essay that appeared in the above-referenced debate. 9 Steve Char-
novitz, who as director of the Global Environment and Trade
Study at Yale University has made several important contributions
to the understanding of the relationship between trade and societal
values,10 followed with an essay that not only responded to my
concerns regarding expansion of standing, but also advocated par-
ticipation by interest groups in policymaking by the World Trade
Organization." Professor Shell concluded the debate with an essay
that not only responded to Charnovitz and myself, but also criti-
cized my proposal that suggested the World Trade Organization
refrain from scrutinizing a country's action if that action reflects
fundamental societal values and only incidentally impedes trade.'2
Professor Shell had the last word in the debate concerning his
proposal for expansion of standing and so it shall remain.13 In this
member of the Dispute Settlement Body votes against adoption of the report. See
id. para. 17.4. For a more thorough explication of the process, see Dillon, supra
note 2, at 373-92; Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming
1996); Reitz, supra note 2, at 580-87.
6 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 910 (1995).
7 Id. at 915.
8 Id.
9 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 303-21.
10 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994); Steve Chamovitz, The World Trade Organi-
zation and Social Issues, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1994, at 17.
11 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 340-48.
12 See Shell, supra note 3, at 378-79; Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
13 I leave that debate with a concession and an observation. Professor Shell
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essay I intend to accomplish two goals. First, I wish to clarify is-
sues raised by Steve Charnovitz concerning the participation by
nongovernment organizations in the policymaking process of the
World Trade Organization. Second, I will respond to Professor
Shell's criticisms of my suggestion for the World Trade Organiza-
tion, and show that the theoretical underpinnings for international
relations are not as limited as set forth in his essay.
2. PARTICIPATION BY INTEREST GROUPS IN POLICYMAKING BY THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Steve Charnovitz advocates participation by nongovernmental
organizations, which I shall refer to as interest groups, 14 "in the
work of the World Trade Organization."15 After discussing the in-
volvement of interest groups in other international organizations
16
and his dissatisfaction with the role of interest groups in both the
GATT and the World Trade Organization, 17 Charnovitz discusses
the need for interest group participation in the policymaking func-
tions of the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, Charnovitz
predicts business entities will someday have standing to bring complaints before
the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement panels (which presumably
would then be given a different name). See Shell supra note 6, at 902-03. If this oc-
curs as Shell predicts, I concede that other interested, nonbusiness parties should
also have access. I observe that Shell's discourse has changed slightly, from an
emphasis on participation by individuals, to one of NGO participation. Compare
Shell, supra note 6, at 915, with Shell, supra note 3, at 376.
14 In the study of international organizations, the term "nongovernmental
organization" includes business entities. As I read Chamovitz, however, he does
not include business entities. Hence my preference for the term "interest groups."
15 Chamovitz, supra note 3, at 331. Charnovitz ignores an argument for direct
participation by individual citizens because "[n]obody... calls for such direct
participation." Id. at 343. In fact, Professor Shell suggests just such participation.
See Shell, supra note 6, at 915 (stating that the Trade Stakeholders Model seeks to
"extend the power to enforce international legal norms beyond states to individu-
als").
16 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 335-37.
17 See id. at 337-40. In the environmental realm, with which Chamovitz is
most concerned, the situation may not be as dire as he depicts. The Policy Dia-
logue on Trade and the Environment, which includes representatives of environ-
mental action groups, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the
World Trade Organization, recently met in "a spirit of common purpose and col-
legiality." Report, Second Meeting, Talloires, France 1 (Apr. 27-29, 1995) (on file
with author). In general, the World Trade Organization has recently adopted
guidelines "for improving transparency and furthering contacts" between the
World Trade Organization and interest groups. General Council Takes Steps to Fur-
ther Relations with NGOs, FOCUS (WTO Newsl.), June-July 1996, at 8.
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structures much of his discussion of policymaking as a response to
and criticism of my discussion of standing before World Trade Or-
ganization dispute settlement panels. As Charnovitz himself
points out, however, standing and participation are distinct phe-
nomena that raise separate issues; one can be extended to nongov-
ernment parties without the other.18 In fact, I applaud the fact that
"the door has been opened" to nongovernmental parties and sug-
gest that "it is probable that some fine tuning could occur in these
arrangements." 19
The fact that the disagreement that Chamovitz posits between
ourselves is a faux disagreement does not mean that Chamovitz
and I agree. In particular, I do not agree that participation in poli-
cymaking can be scrutinized in the context of issues that arise in a
debate over standing. Scrutinizing participation through the lens
of standing produces two dangers: first, progress will appear to oc-
cur as problems that are not really at issue are solved; and second,
pertinent substantial issues will be ignored.20 In this section, I will
attempt to rectify the latter of these problems by identifying sub-
18 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 340 ("These general issues are separable.").
19 Nichols, supra note 3, at 308 n.57.
20 In formal logic, the technique of setting up an argument that does not exist
and then refuting that misrepresented argument is called the "straw man" fallacy.
See DOUGLAS WALTON, A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF FALLACY 57 (1995). The straw man
technique is fallacious because it leads to irrelevancies and because it precludes
the development and resolution of the true issues of contention. See MADSEN
PIRIE, THE BOOK OF THE FALLACY 160 (1985) ("The straw man is fallacious because
he says nothing about the real argument."); WALTON, supra, at 211 (stating that a
straw man "could be a strong impediment to resolving [a] conflict of opinions....
[Ilt would prevent proper maieutic insight into one's own point of view from de-
veloping").
This technique also creates the possibility that an argument will be mis-
characterized. For example, Charnovitz states that "Nichols worries that the pres-
ence of NGOs would undermine 'the apparent authority' of governments, and thus
their ability to negotiate trade policies." Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 342. The pas-
sage that he cites actually reads "expansion of standing will undermine the apparent
authority." Nichols, supra note 3, at 316 (emphasis added). Charnovitz also reports
concern on my part that allowing NGO participation in policymaking would favor
groups with greater resources. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343. The passage
that Charnovitz cites actually discusses the fact that creating another layer of adju-
dication through the expansion of standing would favor wealthier interest groups,
which can fund additional litigation. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 318-19. Similarly
Charnovitz reports concern on my part that interest group participation in policy-
making could cause the World Trade Organization to move away from the pursuit
of liberalized trade. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343. The passage he cites dis-
cusses only the ramifications of expansion of standing. See Nichols, supra note 3, at
319-20.
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stantial issues raised by Charnovitz's proposal that interest groups
take a more substantial role in the deliberations of the World Trade
Organization. These issues involve comparing the World Trade
Organization to other international organizations, examining the
extent and quality of interest group participation, and exploring
whether the inclusion of interest groups enhances or blunts de-
mocratic representation.
2.1. If Every Other International Organization Jumps Off of a Roof,
Should the World Trade Organization Follow?
Charnovitz makes the intriguing argument that "NGOs are on
solid legal ground in seeking greater transparency and participa-
tion in the WTO" because "[d]rawing on the expertise of NGOs is a
hallmark of other intergovernmental organizations and institu-
tions." 21 The first part of this statement can be dismissed;22 what is
intriguing is the comparative methodology that the statement im-
plies. Indeed, Charnovitz makes several references to other inter-
national organizations, including the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, UNESCO, and the International
Labour Organization.
23
Undisciplined comparison of international organizations is
sometimes meaningless because international organizations are
vastly dissimilar.24 A commonly used taxonomy of international
21 Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 334-35.
22 The actions of other international organizations do not place interest
groups on "solid legal ground." Interest groups are on "solid legal ground" be-
cause the Charter of the World Trade Organization allows the General Council of
the World Trade Organization to "make appropriate arrangements for consulta-
tion and cooperation with non-governmental organizations." Charter, supra note
4, art. V(2). The organic documents of any international organization delimits its
functions and authority. See Advisory Opinion No. 3, Agricultural Production
and the International Labor Organization, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, at 53-55
("The answer to the question... must likewise depend entirely upon the con-
struction to be given to the same treaty provisions from which, and from which
alone, that Organization derives its existence and its powers."). The doctrine that
an international organization has implied powers necessary to carry out its speci-
fied functions also bestows authority. See Advisory Opinion Reparations for Inju-
ries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (April 11)
("Under international law, the Organization [United Nations] must be deemed to
have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are con-
ferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties.").
23 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing comparisons).
24 See GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 4-5 (1981) (suggesting that comparison of the GATT and the Euro-
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organizations categorizes organizations by their membership.
Sovereign governments alone comprise the membership of inter-
governmental organizations ("IGOs"); government agencies that
are independent of the central government comprise transgovern-
mental organizations ("TGOs"); nongovernmental organizations
comprise international nongovernmental organizations ("INGOs");
both governmental and nongovernmental members form hybrid
INGOs; and what legal scholars generally refer to as multinational
corporations are business international nongovernmental organiza-
tions ("BINGOs").25 Even this simple taxonomy reveals differences
between the mentioned international organizations: the Interna-
tional Labour Organization is a hybrid INGO, UNESCO is a TGO,
and the OECD and World Trade Organization are IGOs. The fact
that the International Labour Organization and UNESCO occupy
categories different from the World Trade Organization raises
questions about broad comparisons between the organizations.
Advocates of interest group participation may counter that the
point of their efforts is to transform the World Trade Organization
from an IGO to a hybrid INGO, and that any taxonomy based on
membership will always preclude comparison. The point is valid,
but does not mean that international organizations are identical or
that comparison between disparate organizations is valid.
A far more sophisticated taxonomy explicated by Paul Taylor
does not rely on membership but instead relies on the "theory"
underlying each international organization.26 Taylor divides ex-
planations of international organizations into three groups: (1) "ad-
pean Court of Justice is misleading).
25 See CLIvE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 36-43 (1983). Another
common method of classifying international organizations is by their purpose.
See Michel Virally, Definition and Classification of International Organizations: A Legal
Approach, in THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 50, 58-64 (Georges
Abi-Saab ed., 1981) (discussing various purposes an international organization
might have).
26 Paul Taylor, A Conceptual Typology of International Organization, in
FRAMEWORKS FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 12, 12 (A.J.R. Groom & Paul Tay-
lor eds., 1990). Taylor's classification is not, of course, the only departure from the
more standard taxonomies. Johan Galtung, for example, has devised a fascinating
typology based on the degree of association an international organization's mem-
bers have with a discernible territory. Johan Galtung, Non-Territorial Actors: The
Invisible Continent. Towards a Typology of International Organizations, in THE
CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 25, at 67, 67-75. For reasons
discussed above, I find a taxonomy based on the qualities of international organi-
zations more useful than a taxonomy based on the nature of the organizations'
memberships. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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justment theories," which explain the responses of national gov-
ernments to changes in the global environment; (2) "integration
theories," which anticipate a refashioning of the traditional state-
oriented system of international relations; and (3) "constitutional
theories," which go beyond the state system and look toward new
methods of ordering the world into a unified whole. 27
Taylor's taxonomy does not end with these broad divisions.
For example, Taylor divides adjustment theories into different
styles of intergovernmental cooperation in international organiza-
tion: (1) coordination; (2) cooperation; (3) harmonization; (4) asso-
ciation; (5) parallel national action; and (6) supranationalism.
28
Taylor similarly divides integration theories and constitutional
theories. 2
9
Taylor's work is useful for three reasons. First, it shows that in-
ternational organizations can be differentiated on an intrinsic basis
rather than by the nature of their memberships. Second, it illus-
trates the tremendous variety among international organizations.
Most importantly, it raises serious questions about the validity of
undisciplined comparisons of international organizations.
The age-old admonition parents give to their children, "if all
the other kids in the neighborhood jumped off of a roof, would you
want to jump off too," relies on the legitimate premise that all of
the neighborhood children are similar in at least one respect: if
they jump off of a roof, none of them will fly, but instead each will
fall to the ground. Basing the argument for increased participation
by interest groups in World Trade Organization policymaking on
the fact that certain other international organizations allow such
participation depends on establishing similarities between the
World Trade Organization and those organizations. Comparative
analysis cannot be reduced to a simple "me, too" argument.
Charnovitz makes several dubious comparisons. For example,
he compares the World Trade Organization to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council and to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. 0 These two organizations, how-
27 See Taylor, supra note 26, at 12-24.
28 See id. at 12-13.
29 See id. at 17-18, 21-24.
30 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 343. Charnovitz does not explicitly state
that the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the Organization For
Economic Cooperation and Development are comparable to the World Trade Or-
ganization. Rather, he implies comparability by suggesting that the World Trade
Organization can easily borrow procedures from the other organizations.
[Vol. 25:2
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ever, are easily distinguished from the World Trade Organization.
Although both sometimes coordinate the negotiation of discrete
treaties, neither conduct the type of rule creation or enforcement
the World Trade Organization requires. 31 Likewise, the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, which Charnovitz suggests as a model
for the World Trade Organization,32 is also more successful at cre-
ating norms than at devising and enforcing binding regulations.
33
Comparison of a complaint brought by United States Senate res-
taurant workers in the International Labour Organization with
possible suits by domestic interest groups in the World Trade Or-
ganization 34 is nonsensical. The International Labour Organization
does not participate in delicate and complex trade negotiations.
35
Finally, Charnovitz's discussion leaves little doubt that interest
group participation has greatly furthered the resolution of interna-
tional environmental issues. Unfortunately, perhaps because he
bases his comments on issues that pertain to standing, his discus-
sion does not provide insight as to whether the environmental re-
gimes are comparable to the trade regime. What is true of interna-
tional organizations, however, is true of international regimes. The
structure and nature of international institutions matter, and in the
absence of a rigorous treatment of structure, comparative analysis
is suspect.
2.2. Where to Draw the Line
In my essay on standing, I suggest that the fact that
nongovernmental parties do not appear before dispute panels acts
as a buffer between decisionmakers and special interest groups. A
31 See Russian OECD Application Received, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 897 (May
29, 1996) ("[R]ecommendations and resolutions adopted by OECD countries on
the issue are advisory, rather than binding ... ").
32 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 335-36, 343.
33 From the International Labour Organization's creation in 1919 until 1988,
the United States adopted only eight conventions promulgated by the ILO. All
were maritime conventions. The 144th convention promulgated by the ILO
marked the first non-maritime convention that the United States adopted. See
Tadd Linsenmayer, U.S. Ends ILO Moratorium by Ratifying Two Conventions,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1988, at 52, 52. In addition to Conventions, the Interna-
tional Labour Organization issues Recommendations which are not intended to be
binding, but instead are to be "used as general guidelines for national policy and
action." Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States' Participation in the ILO: Redefining
the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 51 (1989).
34 See Chamovitz, supra note 3, at 354.
35 See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (explaining why trade negotia-
tions are laborious and complex).
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buffer between decisionmakers and special interest groups. A
great number of persons usually share the benefits of trade liber-
alization, while the parties harmed by liberalized trade, including
those involved in inefficient industries that cannot survive compe-
tition and those who are collecting monopolistic or oligopolistic
rents created by protectionist laws, are fairly concentrated. 36 If all
parties had standing, narrow protectionist-oriented interest groups
would be more likely to muster the resources necessary to appear
before dispute panels than would the more numerous beneficiaries
of trade liberalization. 37
Charnovitz transposes my arguments concerning standing in
his discussion of participation in policymaking and states, "[tihe
notion that the international trade regime should be a buffer be-
tween the makers of trade policy and the public is an elitist view
that should not find refuge in liberal governance." 38 Although ex-
tremely well-crafted and emotionally appealing, Charnovitz's ar-
gument is also irrelevant and incorrect.39 At some point in a repre-
sentative government, the chosen representative will act
independently of the persons she represents. "Liberal governance"
is replete with policymaking situations in which the public does
not participate. For example, there are no institutional arrange-
ments for interest groups to participate in cabinet meetings in the
executive branch of United States government, or in Council of
Ministers' meetings in the European Union, or in the United Na-
tions Security Council's meetings. At some point participatory
government ends and representative government takes over.
Where this transition occurs is critical, especially when it in-
volves the participation of interest groups. Mancur Olson has
demonstrated that extensive participation by interest groups in
policymaking results in inefficiency, misallocation of resources,
and slow economic growth.40 This phenomenon eventually occurs
36 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 320; Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison,
Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
141, 151-52 (Heinz Hauser ed., 1986).
37 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 36, at 152 (stating that beneficiaries of
trade liberalization lack incentives to gather information, organize, or vote); Shell,
supra note 6, at 878-80 (stating that protected industries mobilize constituencies to
preserve protectionist laws).
38 Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 345.
39 See WALTON, supra note 20, at 196 (stating "relevance is an important aspect
of ad hominem as a fallacy").
40 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-47 (1982).
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even when the interest groups initially represent broad portions of
the population, because achieving the groups' interests requires
such groups to become focused. 41 The United States' experience
with interest group participation in commercial regulation is also
instructive. Regulations that interest groups influence, such as the
tax code, tend to be somewhat distorted.42 Regulations relatively
uninfluenced by interest groups, such as those dealing with securi-
ties, tend to be much less distorted.43
Although interest group participation will impose costs on the
World Trade Organization's regulations, this does not mean that
interest groups should never have a role in policymaking. If inter-
est groups are to be allowed an extensive role in policymaking,
however, then the benefits of such participation must outweigh the
costs that the public will bear.
Against these costs, Charnovitz suggests two benefits of in-
creased participation by interest groups in World Trade Organiza-
tion policymaking. He suggests that interest group participation
will do the following: (1) "prod" governments to negotiate more
41 See Mancur Olson Jr., The Devolution of the Nordic and Teutonic Economies, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 22, 25 (1995).
42 See ROBERT H. SALISBURY, INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: SUBSTANCE AND
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 339 (1992) (stating that taxation has acquired
many of its strange contours because of the pressures and demands of narrowly-
based interest groups).
43 See Alexander C. Dill, Broker-Dealer Regulations Under the Securities Act of
1934: The Case of Independent Contracting, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 189, 253 (1994).
The trade regime's experience with interest groups is also instructive. Indeed, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade came into existence partly to avoid
distortive pressures by interest groups. "I was told that Will Clayton said that 'we
need to act before the vested interests get their vests on.' Whether he really said
that, I don't know, but it makes the point." William Diebold, Reflections on the In-
ternational Trade Organization, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 335, 336 (1994).
Charnovitz points out that the charter for the International Trade Organization,
negotiated at the same time as the other Bretton Woods institutions but never final-
ized, allowed interest group participation. Charnovitz suggests that had the Inter-
national Trade Organization come into existence, its creators would have allowed
interest group participation. See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 338-39. The persons
who negotiated the International Trade Organization charter, however, are the same
persons who administered the GATT. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Book Review, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 664 (1995) (reviewing ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
(1993) and noting the club-like atmosphere of the early GAT). In its early years,
the GATT allowed nongovernment parties to participate in the GATT process. See
Nichols, supra note 3, at 305. If, as Charnovitz suggests, the GAIT later terminated
the early practice of allowing interest group participation, one must ask why it did
SO.
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quickly and to better results; and (2) increase public support for
trade liberalization.44 These proposed benefits merit closer scru-
tiny.
2.2.1. Faster and Better Results
Charnovitz, to his credit, does not overstate the possibility that
interest groups could produce more diligent negotiations; he
couches his comments in words such as "could" and "might." His
one piece of evidence to substantiate the claim that participation by
interest groups will result in more effective negotiation is that dur-
ing the seven years of Uruguay Round negotiations, interest
groups played an active role in the negotiations of seven global en-
vironmental agreements. 45 The comparison between the Uruguay
Round and the negotiation of these environmental accords, how-
ever, is spurious. Generally, multinational trade negotiations are
not like any other form of international negotiation. Rather, the
most-favored-nation principle, which mandates that any conces-
sion granted to one party must be extended to every other party,
makes them more complex.46 The Uruguay Round in particular
was the most complex trade negotiation ever undertaken.47 More-
over, unlike almost every other treaty, countries had to accept the
results of the Uruguay Round in their entirety; countries could not
reserve or refuse to abide by certain portions of the treaty.48
44 See Chamovitz, supra note 3, at 341, 344-45.
45 See id. at 341 (citing Jessica Mathews, The Great Greenless GATT, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at A19).
46 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 316-17; see also GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 52-56 (1992) (describing the
complexity and difficulty of negotiating international trade agreements). The
most-favored-nation principle makes negotiators reluctant to give concessions to
one party, because they will lose leverage over other parties. See GILBERT R.
WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 62 (1986).
47 See supra note 1; Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 477 ("The agenda for the Uru-
guay Round was massive, making it by far the most ambitious trade negotiation
ever.").
48 Most treaties contain a provision allowing a party to state that it will not be
bound by a certain portion of that treaty, a practice that has become widespread
in recent years. See FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLA-
RATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 2-4 (1988) (" [T]he phenomenon of reservations
has developed into a problem of international law .... "). The ability to carve out
portions of a treaty obviously makes the process of negotiation easier, and accep-
tance of treaties more likely. See John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral
Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 372 (1980)
("Most arguments in favor of the liberal use of reservations have as their comer-
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The proposition that adding more participants to a negotiation
will bring the negotiation to a more rapid conclusion is inherently
suspect. The usual result is the converse, that more participants
tend to lengthen negotiations.49 In the absence of legitimate em-
pirical information, this purported rationale for incurring the costs
of interest group participation remains at issue.
In addition to suggesting that interest group participation will
lead to quicker results, Charnovitz suggests that it will lead to bet-
ter results. To support his assertion that the Uruguay Round pro-
duced flawed results, he relies on an assessment by Jeffrey Schott
and Johanna Buurman which gave the Uruguay Round a grade of
"B+." 5 0 Schott and Buurman published their insightful and widely
stone the belief that the liberal admissibility of reservations will encourage wider
acceptance of treaties."). The treaties that create and accompany the World Trade
Organization, on the other hand, must be accepted as a whole-a party may not
carve out any portion and refuse to abide by that portion. See Final Act, supra note
5, para. 4 ("[T]he WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance as a whole.");
Charter, supra note 4, art. XVI(5) ("No reservations may be made in respect of any
provisions of this Agreement."); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views
Toward Recoupment and Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichot-
omy Through WTO-Consistent Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69,
127 (1996) (" [S]ignatories must accept the Agreement 'as a whole.'").
49 See Tom Farer, New Players in the Old Game: The De Facto Expansion of Stand-
ing to Participate in Global Security Negotiations, 38 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 842, 862-63
(1995) (noting that international organizations and interest groups have been
granted access to international security negotiations, but predicting that continu-
ous expansion of standing will overwhelm the process and hinder the creation of
effective global solutions). Charnovitz states that "[olne reason why the Uruguay
Round took so long to complete was because little occurred during extended peri-
ods of time as governments either stewed at each other or awaited national elec-
tions in individual countries." Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 341. John Croome's
book-length discussion of the Uruguay Round negotiations reveals that there
were times when formal negotiations were not conducted. CROOME, supra note 1,
passim. During these periods there was much activity by the GATT Secretariat or
by informal negotiating groups. See id. It should also be noted that the one ex-
ample that Charnovitz provides-the dispute between the United States and the
European Union over agriculture -occurred at the behest of special interest
groups.
50 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 341-42 n.51 (citing JEFFREY J. SCHOTr &
JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 8 (1994). As a gen-
eral indictment of the trade regime Charnovitz cites an estimate by Mahbub ul
Haq that "only seven percent of world production crossing national borders is
subject to the trade liberalization rules of the GATT." Charnovitz, supra note 3, at
346 (citing Overview, in THE UN AND THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 5 (Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds.,
1995)). Ul Haq provides no methodology for his estimate. His explanatory com-
ments, however, shed much light on his estimate: "excluding as it does agricul-
tural commodities, tropical products, textiles, services, capital flows, labour flows,
intellectual property resources, etc." Overview, supra, at 5. These, of course, are
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respected assessment under the auspices of the International Eco-
nomic Institute. Their assessment takes as its standard of perfec-
tion a purely economic and commercially-oriented paradigm for
world trade regulation; most of their criticisms of the Uruguay
Round concern concessions to interest groups. 51 As a baseline of
perfection, Schott and Buurman's version of an "A+" agreement is
probably not an agreement with which Charnovitz would be com-
fortable. Moreover, it almost certainly is not an agreement that
could be achieved with extensive interest group participation.
If interest group participation yields the "best results," it will
not be because the best results are economically efficient. Both
Mancur Olson and common sense indicate that interest group par-
ticipation will result in inefficiencies and misallocations. 52 If inter-
est group participation yields better results, it will be because those
the very subjects the Uruguay Round covered and the World Trade Organization
continues to negotiate. In fact, in a later essay in the same anthology, ul Haq
states that "[t]he recently concluded Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations may, however, change this situation." Mahbub ul Haq, The Vision and the
Reality, in THE UN AND THE BRETrON WOODS INSTITUTIONS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra, at 26, 30. It is true, as Charnovitz points out,
that stubborn pockets of protectionism remain-no one claims that the work of
the trade regime is finished. The usual criticism of the trade regime is not, how-
ever, that it is as protectionist as implied by Charnovitz. Rather, the usual criti-
cism is that the trade regime emphasizes free trade over other societal values. See
Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66
TEMP. L. REv. 751, 751 (1993) ("[N]on-trade concerns are subordinate to trade con-
cerns within the GATT framework."); Alberto Berhabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the
Impossible Dream:" Globalization and Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205, 224 n.99 (1995) (describing World Trade Organization as
a "regime that places trade uber alles"); Robert Howse & Michael Trebilcock, The
Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour and the Environment, in ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Alan 0. Sykes & Jagdeep Bhandari eds.,
forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 1, 2-3, on file with author) ("A visceral distrust
of any or all demands for trade restrictions has impeded a careful analysis of the
kinds of normative claims at issue .. "); Nichols, supra note 12, at 700 ("That the
trade regime gives primacy to trade is evidenced throughout the history of the
GATT dispute settlement, as well as in the writings of officials and scholars
closely allied with the General Agreement and the nascent World Trade Organiza-
tion."); Shell, supra note 6, at 837 (stating that various models of trade manage-
ment "seek to promote trade over other domestic and transnational values").
51 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 341-42 n.51 (citing SCHOTr & BUURMAN, su-
pra note 50, at 8). Fortunately, there are less dogmatic assessments of the Uruguay
Round, which generally are favorable. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Reflections on In-
ternational Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 23 (1996) ("The Uruguay
Round itself has been the most ambitious of the trade rounds under GATT, and
would be a success with half of its achievements.").
52 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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results more accurately reflect and satisfy the needs, desires, and
wishes of the majority of persons who live under the regime cre-
ated by those results.5 3 This depends on whether interest group
participation enhances the ability of the World Trade Organization
to perceive and act upon those needs, desires, and wishes. I ad-
dress that issue in a later section of this essay.
54
2.2.2. Increased Public Support
Charnovitz also suggests that interest group participation in
policymaking will broaden public support for the World Trade
Organization.55 If this is true, it would easily justify the costs of in-
terest group participation. Unfortunately, Charnovitz provides no
evidence for this proposition, and his anecdotal statements deal en-
tirely with the United States. A brief review of the literature re-
veals, however, that interest groups are not universally trusted
outside of the United States.
56
Even with respect to the United States and Western Europe,
where interest groups flourish,57 I hesitate to accept the assertion
53 Satisfaction of needs, desires, and wishes is often but not always coincident
with economic efficiency. See Nichols, supra note 12, at 704. For example, econo-
mists can construct arguments that promote the sale of human beings as efficient.
See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Short-
age, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 339 (1978) (suggesting elimination of restrictions "that
prevent the market from operating freely in the sale of babies as of other goods").
Society does not countenance the sale of human beings, not because it is efficient
or inefficient, but because it is wrong. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 376-77 (1990) (stating that slavery is economically defensible but
intuitively wrong); see also STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 29 (1981) (arguing that people make decisions on the basis
of beliefs rather than economics).
54 See infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
55 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 347. Shell makes this point as well. See
Shell, supra note 6, at 922-24.
56 See, e.g., Marx V. Aristide & Laurie Richardson, 'Democracy Enhance-
ments'- U.S. Style, NACLA REP. ON THE AM., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 35, 35 (arguing that
under the guise of nongovernmental organizations, the United States channeled
millions of dollars into Haiti to destabilize popular movements and to undermine
Jean-Baptiste Aristide); Rebecca Dodd, 'Do-Goodism is Ruining This Country,'
WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 1995, at 9 (reporting Rwandan concerns that nongovern-
ment organizations are hindering Rwanda's post-war recovery). But see John
Clark, The State, Popular Participation, and the Voluntary Sector, 23 WORLD DEV. 593,
593 (1995) (stating that nongovernmental organizations sometimes best represent
the poorest sectors of developing countries).
57 See Lester M. Salamon, The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector, FOREIGN AFF., July-
Aug. 1994, at 109, 109-22 (documenting the increase in the number of nonprofit
interest groups in the United States and Western Europe and suggesting that such
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that interest group participation increases public support without
empirical validation of this hypothesis. An informal survey of
thirty acquaintances and colleagues 58 reaffirmed my doubts re-
garding the assumption. Although twenty-three belonged to or
supported financially interest groups or nonprofit nongovernment
organizations, none knew whether their group participated in poli-
cymaking in any international organizations. Similarly, most did
not know whether participation by their chosen organization
would cause them to support the work of an international organi-
zation.59
Although this informal survey lacks the rigor necessary to
prove or disprove Charnovitz's hypothesis, it does suggest that the
assumption that interest group participation in policymaking will
increase public support for the World Trade Organization may not
be as straightforward as Charnovitz implies. Indeed, without em-
pirical data legitimately applicable to the World Trade Organiza-
tion or a coherent theoretical rationale that takes into account the
structure of the World Trade Organization, this issue too must be
considered unresolved.
The participation of "special" interest groups also raises serious
questions with respect to public support. In the United States, the
participation of "special" interest groups generates disdain instead
of support.60 "Special interest group," however, is merely a term of
groups may "permanently alter" the relationship between states and citizens).
58 One in Moscow, one in Frankfurt, four in Canada, and the remainder in the
United States.
59 Four responded affirmatively, one said no, two refused to participate, and
the remaining twenty-three felt they did not have sufficient information to answer
the question.
60 A Gordon S. Black poll taken May 1992 found:
74% of registered likely voters agreed that 'Congress is largely owned by
the special interest groups,' 83% agreed that '[t]he special interest groups
that give campaign contributions to candidates have more influence over
the government than the voters,' and 85% agreed that '[s]pecial interest
money buys the loyalty of candidates.'
Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1126, 1129 (1994); see also Cass R. Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 29 (1985) ("[T]he
American scheme of governance.., is challenged on the grounds that it allows
powerful private organizations to block necessary government action.., the law-
making process has been transformed into a series of accommodations among com-
peting elites .... ") (citations omitted). Of course, the United States Congress and
the World Trade Organization are not comparable institutions: members of the
World Trade Organization are not elected officials and thus do not require cam-
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art and does not designate an identifiable subset of interest groups.
Any attempt to preclude participation by interest groups on the
grounds that the groups are "special interest groups" would raise
troubling questions of fairness and normative bias.
2.3. The Democracy of Interest Groups
The possibility of increased participation by interest groups in
World Trade Organization policymaking raises the question of
whether interest groups enhance the democratic process. This
question can be broken down into two issues: whether the creation
of trade policy fails to reflect the goals of the majority of persons
who live under that policy, and whether interest groups are de-
mocratic institutions.
2.3.1. Failure of International Trade Policy
Although I first suggested the question of a failure of democ-
ratic institutions in the context of government representation in a
dispute,61 Charnovitz transposes the question to his discussion of
participation by interest groups in policymaking. 62 He then an-
swers the question, stating that "many national governments fail to
represent the interests of even a majority of their constituencies as
periodically reflected by low approval ratings." 63 With that state-
ment, he brushes aside the theoretical and empirical work of per-
sons such as Robert Dahl, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Roland
Pennock.64 More importantly, he fails to respond to Daniel Ver-
dier's exhaustive study on the relationship between democracy
and international trade policy, in which Verdier concludes:
Voters control policymaking because elections provide policy-
makers with incentives to reproduce within their institutional mi-
crocosms the parametric structure of the electorate. Voters signal
to their elected representatives the balance between particular and
general goals that they wish to see struck by the legislative process.
paign funding. Nonetheless, the data indicates a deep mistrust of special interest
groups.
61 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 310 ("Professor Shell's suggestion of expanding
standing beyond member nations implicitly assumes that national governments
do not adequately represent the interests of all of their constituencies."). I point
out that this assumption is not valid. See id. at 312.
62 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 342.
63 Id.
64 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 311-12, n.78.
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Voter control is indirect, since voters do not choose the outcome;
rather, they create the incentive structure that motivates politicians
to legislate in accordance with voter concerns. In short, if electors
do not necessarily choose policies, they do choose the decision
rules by which lawmakers make policies.
65
Indeed, there were numerous avenues by which citizens and
other entities provided input, through their governments, to the
Uruguay Round.
66
Charnovitz suggests -without explaining why it is critical that
these groups have a voice -that international interest groups do
not have national governments to represent them in the World
Trade Organization. 67 The list of organizations that he provides,
however, indicates that the opposite may be true. The World
Wildlife Federation has its base and a powerful lobby in Washing-
ton D.C.68 The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is
an active member of the International Labour Organization,
69
which may work with the World Trade Organization on labor is-
sues.70 And the International Chamber of Commerce not only
works directly with the World Trade Organization, but also works
with a number of national governments.
71
In short, it cannot be argued that there is a broad failure by
governments to represent the interests of constituencies and of in-
terest groups. 72 A better argument for interest group participation,
65 DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BRITAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE UNITED STATES 1860-1990, at 290 (1994); see also Nichols, supra note 3, at
312 n.79 (citing and discussing Verdier).
66 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 305-07 & nn.48-55.
67 See Chamovitz, supra note 3, at 343.
68 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental
Law Paradigm and its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 822 n.58 (1986).
69 See Schlossberg, supra note 33, at 77-78; Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol,
Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 15, 57 (1994).
70 See The European Commission: This Week In Europe, M2 Presswire, July 26,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("WTO activity in this field
could support the work of the International Labour Organisation, the [European]
Commission argues ... ").
71 See Jon Marks, Trade's Global Police Force, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 1996, Exporter
at 16 (describing the International Chamber of Commerce).
72 Ironically, Chamovitz provides examples of domestic representation of
constituent interests in the United States. While attempting to demonstrate that
the founders of the liberal trade regime favored public participation, Chamovitz
provides three pieces of evidence, each from the United States, extolling the virtue
of public participation in domestic policymaking on international trade issues. See
Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 345-46 & nn.70-71. Presumably, once an agenda was
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then, must be found in the possibility that such participation will
enhance representation of persons in the World Trade Organiza-
tion.
2.3.2. Enhancement of Representation through Interest Groups
At best, interest groups act as the analogue of a class in litiga-
tion: they allow a large number of persons with a proportionally
smaller interest in a matter to deal on an equal basis with a small
number of entities whose concentrated interest is proportionally
greater. Charnovitz and others have shown that interest groups
have carried out this function quite well in the area of environ-
mental regulations. 73 Given, however, that trade negotiations are
not entirely comparable to environmental negotiations, and that
they are vulnerable to misuse by interest groups to different de-
grees, one cannot assume that interest groups will be as efficacious
in trade policymaking.
In the first place, interest groups are not necessarily democratic
or independent. In general, interest groups are not accountable in
a formal sense to the constituencies they purport to represent, and
often the leadership of these groups is not selected by that con-
stituency.74 In some countries interest groups simply cannot be
democratic or independent; their very survival depends on suc-
cumbing to pressure from the government.75
Moreover, the quality and legitimacy of an interest group is not
bona fide simply because the group is not associated with a gov-
ernment. Any entity that has money can create an interest group.76
agreed upon at the domestic level, a government representative would advocate
that agenda in the international arena.
73 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 335-37; A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1992).
74 Cf. Paul Hirst, Quangos and Democratic Government, 48 PARLIAMENTARY AFF.
341, 341-42 (1991) (reporting serious concerns created by the fact that quasi-
independent nongovernmental organizations in Britain are not elected and there-
fore not accountable). It must be repeated that interest group representation does
not constitute participatory government in the Burkean sense; it is representative
government with a selected, rather than elected, representative.
75 See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of
the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 494 (1994) (stating that the nongovernment organization
movement in Indonesia "cannot (or not yet) be taken as the opening of a democ-
ratic space, given the extent to which the movement must abjure politics and al-
low itself to be co-opted so as not to be destroyed").
76 See SUSAN B. TRENTO, THE POWER HOUSE: ROBERT KEITH GRAY AND THE
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While this may not be a problem in the context of environmental
policymaking, 77 it has become a problem in general.78 Any effort,
however, by the World Trade Organization to screen out illegiti-
mate or manufactured interest groups will engender troubling
questions of subjectivity and normative bias. 79
Finally, Charnovitz neither raises nor resolves the fundamental
paradox of interest group participation in the process of govern-
ance: "interest groups solve collective action problems, but they
bring destructive factionalism.., in their wake."80 Again, the dif-
ferences in regimes compound the problem. Arguably, interest
groups involved in international environmental regulation repre-
sent the interests of the majority, and provide a necessary coun-
terweight to narrowly-defined groups that would exploit the
commons for their own benefit.8 ' Conversely, in the context of in-
ternational commercial regulation, it can be argued that interest
groups are unlikely to represent the general interest and are more
likely to represent narrowly defined groups.8 2 If the latter premise
is true-and Charnovitz presents no argument that it is not-then
participation by interest groups could increase factionalism and
decrease the degree to which the resulting regulations represent
the majority of persons governed by those regulations.
SELLING OF ACCESS AND INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON 86-87, 196-97, 200 (1992) (pro-
viding examples of the instant creation of interest groups).
77 Actually, there is some evidence that it is a problem. See Lynette Lamb,
Deceptive Associations, UTNE READER, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 18 (reporting on false public
interest groups, including groups that posture as pro-environment but are actu-
ally funded by commercial interests opposed to environmental regulations).
78 See Public Interest Pretenders, 59 CONSUMER REP. 316, 316-18 (1994) (docu-
menting advocacy groups that are fronts for, funded by, or controlled by corpora-
tions or trade associations).
79 The fact that the United Nations or other international organizations that
interact with interest groups may not have encountered this problem is irrelevant.
The World Trade Organization will present businesses and protectionist groups
with a much different set of incentives than the United Nations.
80 Lillian R. Bevier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1273 (1994).
81 African citizens might question this premise. See JONATHAN S. ADAMS &
THOMAS 0. MCSHANE, THE MYTH OF WILD AFRICA: CONSERVATION WITHOUT
ILLUSION xii-xviii (1992) (discussing differences between the views of western en-
vironmental groups and citizens of Africa).
82 See Rowley & Tollison, supra note 36, at 152 (stating that beneficiaries of
trade liberal factions lack incentives to organize); Shell, supra note 6, at 878-79
(stating that uncompetitive producers "mobilize labor and other constituencies to
protect them from foreign competition").
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2.4. Participation by Interest Groups in Policymaking by the World
Trade Organization
In the end, Charnovitz and I do not disagree that the World
Trade Organization should benefit from the input of entities other
than its own members. I am troubled, however, by the lack of a ra-
tional basis for participation by interest groups. Unfortunately, an
argument that is structured on issues that arise in the context of
standing provides only shallow justification. This essay should not
be interpreted as an argument that the World Trade Organization
could never benefit from interest group participation. Indeed, I be-
lieve that it could. Instead this essay presents three issues that are
fundamental to a discussion of interest group participation in poli-
cymaking within the World Trade Organization. Those issues are:
(1) the comparability of the World Trade Organization to interna-
tional organizations and regimes that have successfully integrated
interest groups into policymaking; (2) the extent of participation
that can be sustained by the World Trade Organization; and (3)
whether interest group participation enhances or inhibits represen-
tation of the majority's opinions and desires. Resolution of these
three issues would contribute significantly to the creation of a rig-
orous argument in favor of interest group participation in policy-
making.
3. PROFESSOR SHELL'S CRITICISM OF A PROPOSED EXCEPTION To
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SCRUTINY
In his concluding contribution to our debate, Professor Shell re-
considers his earlier, tepid approval of my proposal for the crea-
tion of a doctrine that would exempt certain government practices
from scrutiny by the World Trade Organization. Shell's criticism
of my proposal hinges on two arguments: first, that it rests on an
invalid theoretical underpinning; and second, that it represents a
retreat from legalism and thus could damage the liberal trading
system. In this section, I argue that by characterizing institutional-
ism as an iteration of realism Shell paints too stark a picture of the
theoretical landscape of international law. I also show that the
proposed exception affirms, rather than retreats from, the concept
that dispute settlement within the World Trade Organization is
more legalistic than it was under the GATT. Finally, I reiterate
safeguards that I originally proposed to protect the liberal trade
system.
To summarize my proposal, the trade agreements annexed to
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the Charter of the World Trade Organization act as templates
against which the laws and actions of countries can be evaluated.
When a country's action violates a trade agreement, or when the
action nullifies or impairs a benefit promised under a trade agree-
ment, the suffering country may ask the World Trade Organization
to review the offending country's action and provide assistance in
obtaining relief. Decisions made by panels convened under the
GATT very much favored trade over other values. Dispute settle-
ment under the GATT, however, was flexible and allowed for ne-
gotiation of panel decisions. Continuation of a one-sided approach
by the World Trade Organization, which possesses a more rigid
dispute settlement system, endangers the viability of the liberal
trading system. I suggest that the World Trade Organization
should interpret its organic documents to exempt from scrutiny ac-
tions by members that reflect underlying societal values and only
incidentally impede trade.
83
3.1. Theoretical Constructs and Contrasts
Shell presents a dichotomy between two competing schools of
international relations theory: realism and liberalism. According to
Shell, realism "views states as the primary actors in world affairs
and treats all states as autonomous, self-interested, and animated
by the single-minded pursuit of power."84 Under liberalism, on the
other hand, "nations are neither conceived of as autonomous, self-
maximizing actors, nor are they considered the ultimate actors on
the international stage." 85 "Rather, private individuals, businesses,
and interest groups" comprise the essential actors.86
Although Shell does not do so, this characterization could just
as easily apply to the traditional dichotomy that once paralyzed in-
ternational law theory. The realist view posits that states are the
only actors in international law. Idealists, on the other hand, be-
lieve that international law transcends states and will ultimately
lead to a legalistic world government. 87 The stalemate between
these two competing theories contributed to the intellectual im-
83 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 300-02.
84 Shell, supra note 3, at 364 (citation omitted).
85 Id. at 367 (citing Shell, supra note 6, at 847 & n.85).
86 Id. at 367 (citing Linda C. Reif, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Improve-
ment of International Environmental Law and Institutions, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 723, 737
(1994) (book review)).
87 See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW xii-xvii (1989).
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poverishment of international law in the years following the Sec-
ond World War.88 Moreover, neither theory accurately describes
the way that countries and other entities actually behave.
89
Fortunately, international law theory is no longer limited to
these two choices. David Kennedy and Chris Tennant identify "a
dramatic increase during the past two decades in the volume of
scholarly work that aims to rethink the foundations of interna-
tional law and to respond to recent trends in political, social and
legal theory." 90 They have compiled a thirty-page bibliography of
papers that depart from traditional theories of international law,
which they refer to as "New Stream" theories.91 These theories do
not constitute a single, cohesive argument; rather, they take a vari-
ety of approaches and import concepts from a variety of disci-
plines.9
2
88 Cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 464-76 (1989) (describing competing theories in
international law).
89 Sixteen years ago, David Kennedy set out the theoretical contradictions in-
herent to both schools of thought. See David Kennedy, Theses About International
Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353 (1980). A state cannot be internally ab-
solute, as realist doctrine maintains, and at the same time be externally social. See
id. at 361. On the other hand, an issue is not "international" until the interests of
states collide. See id. at 362. Yet, idealists assign states a secondary or nonexistent
role. Empirical indictment of the realist doctrine is abundant; in this debate the
International Labour Organization has been used several times for that very pur-
pose. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 3, at 372; see also Kennedy, supra, at 362-64 (setting
out manifestations of realist contradiction). Empirical assessment of idealism is
not as easy, because the means by which private actors supposedly manipulate
the government are secretive. An excellent study by Alessandro Bonanno, Doug-
las Constance, and Mary Hendrickson, however, uses the mass of evidence gener-
ated by the corruption investigations in Italy as a means of examining the rela-
tionship between a very large transnational corporation ("TNC") and a
government. Alessandro Bonanno et al., Global Agro-Food Corporations and the
State: The Ferruzzi Case, 60 RURAL Soc. 274 (1995). A specific purpose of their
study was to determine whether the state continues to have relevance in the mod-
em global political and economic system. See id. at 274; see also id. at 275-79 (dis-
cussing various theories regarding relevancy of states). After reviewing the em-
pirical data, they conclude that "[i]n the interaction between TNCs and the state,
clearly TNCs control and limit the action of the state. However, this control is
only partial as the state retains powers which it uses to oppose TNCs." Id. at 289.
In other words, idealism does not fully explain reality.
90 David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A
Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417, 418 (1994).
91 Id. at 431-60.
92 Some of these writers are public international law scholars, while others
focus on specific issues, such as the environment, nationalism, or trade. Others
come from legal sociology, comparative law, or legal philosophy. Still others use
insights from anthropology, economics, and feminism. See id. at 418-19.
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Similar to international law theory, international relations the-
ory is no longer limited to the choice between cynical realism or
idealistic utopianism. One alternative is institutionalism, the study
of regimes. "Regimes are principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge."93
Institutionalists are particularly interested in the formation of re-
gimes, factors that lead to the persistence or demise of regimes,
categorization of regimes, and the consequences of regimes.94
Professor Shell, of course, is fully versed in the theory of inter-
national law. In the current debate, however, he describes institu-
tionalism as "an iteration of realism."95 While institutionalism
does have roots in realist theory,96 Shell's earlier characterization of
institutionalism as a departure from realism is more accurate.
97
Indeed, one reason for the development of institutionalism was
that realists could not explain the continued vitality of interna-
tional organizations after the end of the cold war and the demise of
U.S. hegemony. 98 Institutionalists provided the answer: regimes
matter because they shape actors' behavior in ways that are incon-
Kennedy's own scholarship on international law utilizes the techniques of criti-
cal legal studies. See Carl Landauer, Book Review, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287 (1989) (re-
viewing DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987)).
93 STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST
GLOBAL LIBERALISM 4 (1985). The connections between institutionalism and inter-
national law are abundant. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations
Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 406-41 (1989).
Institutionalism is now at the forefront of international law theory. See W. Mi-
chael Reisman, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1991) (describing regime
theories as "the current rage in the United States").
94 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 454, 454-55
(1995) (discussing the thrust of REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(Volker Rittberger ed. 1993)).
95 Shell, supra note 3, at 366 (footnote omitted); see also Shell, supra note 6, at
858 ("Like realism, regime theory treats states as autonomous actors in the inter-
national arena and focuses on state behavior as the key variable in analyzing in-
ternational relations.") Shell uses the older label "regime theory" for institutional-
ism.
96 See Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, 36
INT'L ORG. 479, 491-93 (1982) (explicating and criticizing realist roots of institu-
tionalism).
97 See Shell, supra note 6, at 860; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Interna-
tional Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205,
218-19 (1993) (characterizing institutionalism as a "challenge" to realism).
98 See Burley, supra note 97, at 218-19. The realist explanation for interna-
tional organizations was that they were maintained at the behest of a hegemon.
See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 8-10 (1984).
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sistent with an analysis of actors' relative powers.99
Many institutionalist scholars have remained true to the realist
roots of institutionalism and treat states as the primary actors in in-
ternational relations or law.100 This is not, however, the definition
of institutionalist theory. Recent work in institutionalism includes
a variety of actors other than states in international relations.1 1
Alec Stone proposes a continuum of regimes and actors, including
actors other than nations.10 2 Indeed, although he does not make
this claim, Paul Taylor's taxonomy of international organizations
represents an excellent example of such work. It focuses solely on
the nature of the institution and the underlying theory of an or-
ganization, and presents a spectrum of organizations, from those
composed solely of nations to those in which nationhood is irrele-
vant.103
Shell's characterization of liberalism denies nations a primary
role in international relations and law.104 I agree wholeheartedly
with Shell that realism does not fully describe the world as it is. If,
as Shell suggests, I were to locate "all 'societal values' squarely
within nation-states and nowhere else," 105 then I would blind my-
self to the myriad international, transnational, and local societal
values.106 Further, if, as Shell suggests, I found international or-
ganizations in which nations share power with nongovernmental
entities "inconceivable," 10 7 then I would blind myself to many of
the more interesting international organizations that have come
into existence in this century.108 Realism shuts one eye to the world
99 See Slaughter, supra note 94, at 454.
100 See Burley, supra note 97, at 218.
101 See SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS 199-200 (1988); see also Virginia
Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public and Private: International Regimes and
Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 94,
at 94.
102 See Alec Stone, Mhat is a Supranational Constitution?: An Essay in Interna-
tional Relations Theory, 56 REV. POL. 441, 470-74 (1994).
103 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
104 Shell, supra note 3, at 367; see also id. at 370 ("[T]he Trade Stakeholders
Model sees individuals and groups-not states-as the primary actors in interna-
tional relations.").
105 Shell, supra note 3, at 371.
106 Of course, I do not. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 299 ("Just as is true of
multinational legal regimes (and just as is true of local legal regimes), national le-
gal regimes often reflect underlying societal values.").
107 Shell, supra note 3, at 371-72.
108 Again, I do not. See Nichols, supra note 3, at 300 (discussing the Interna-
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as it actually exists.
Shell's liberalism, however, is equally blind; it simply closes the
other eye. By excluding nations as significant international actors,
liberalism suffers exactly the same deficiencies as realism. It re-
fuses to see a portion of the world as it actually exists. 109
Shell's theoretical perspective may be closer to mine than his
writing suggests. Although he states on several occasions that his
model "sees individuals and groups-not states-as the primary
actors in international relations," 110 he speaks elsewhere of busi-
ness interests joining government in the international arena."' He
also states that his model "seeks to break the monopoly of states on
international dispute resolution machinery," 112 which could be in-
terpreted as leaving a role for governments. Creating such a role
for the state would represent an intriguing departure from tradi-
tional liberalism, in which "the state is conceived of as the agent for
particular domestic constituencies' interests, not as a self-
motivated actor seeking power or political stability."" 3 This de-
parture holds exciting possibilities, and could herald the incorpora-
tion of institutionalist elements into liberalism.
Nonetheless, Shell correctly observes that the "differences be-
tween [our] views can better be summarized as a difference in
theoretical approach."" 4 Under his approach, the World Trade
Organization cannot be an organization of nations and ideally will
evolve into a "World Union" similar to the European Union.115 On
the other hand, I am willing to accept that the World Trade Or-
tional Labour Organization and INTELSAT, and distinguishing them from the
World Trade Organization).
109 An excellent student note in the Harvard Law Review chides realists and
idealists for the exclusive nature of their theories and suggests that both explain,
at various times, the reality of international law. See Note, Developing Countries
and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the Promise of Development, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1715, 1730 (1995).
110 Shell, supra note 3, at 370 (emphasis added); see id. at 367 ("Under liberal-
ism, nations are neither conceived of as autonomous, self-maximizing actors, nor
are they considered the ultimate actors on the international stage."); Shell, supra
note 6, at 877 (describing "reduction in the status of the state" under liberalism).
111 See Shell, supra note 6, at 885.
112 Id. at 915.
113 Id. at 877.
114 Shell, supra note 3, at 371.
115 See id. at 373 (suggesting "the EU as a possible source of inspiration for
what the WTO can become" (emphasis in original)). Shell does not use the term
"World Union."
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ganization is an organization of nations and place it near one end
of Taylor's taxonomy. While I also accept that there are a multi-
tude of other forms of international organizations, I am not forced
to believe that change from one form to another is inevitable, or
even always desirable. I have the luxury of critically evaluating
the proposed changes, and measuring them against the internal
coherence of the organization and the realization of potential bene-
fits.
3.2. Legalism and Dispute Settlement
Professor Shell suggests that my proposal would "turn the
clock backward instead of forward on trade governance." 116 By
this, I presume that he means that my proposal is a retreat from the
movement toward legalism that he carefully describes.1 7 I dis-
agree; it is only because the dispute system has become more legal-
istic that an exception, such as the one I propose, is required.
The dispute settlement system under the GATT was almost
identical to that set forth in the World Trade Organization's Un-
derstanding on Dispute Settlement," 8 with one critical difference.
Under both systems, panel reports are meaningless until adopted
by the parties to the GATT or the members of the World Trade Or-
ganization. Under the GATT, adoption required the consensus of
all voting parties, which meant that a losing party could block with
its single vote the adoption of a panel report. The possibility that a
losing party could block the adoption of a panel report created a
certain degree of flexibility in the system and lent it an almost dip-
lomatic nature." 9
Under the World Trade Organization's system, the process is
the reverse. Panel reports are automatically adopted unless all vot-
ing members vote against adoption. This has led most observers,
including Professor Shell, to characterize the process as more legal-
istic than that which occurred under the GATT.
As I have noted, with legalism comes rigidity. Members 120 can
no longer negotiate once a panel has indicated that their actions
116 Id. at 362.
117 See Shell, supra note 6, at 894.
118 See Understanding, supra note 5.
119 See Nichols, supra note 5, at 100.
120 Setting aside for one moment the differences in theoretical underpinnings,
this would be true regardless of whether members are countries, individuals, in-
terest groups, or other nongovernment entities.
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violate a trade agreement or nullify or impair the benefits of an-
other member. Their choice is more stark: comply with or defy the
regulation.
If not overdone, this legalistic rigidity is beneficial.' 21 No legal
system can survive, however, if it becomes overly rigid. Courts in
the United States create exceptions to statutes and constitutions on
a regular basis; there is a body of court-created exceptions and in-
terpretations to virtually every constitutional amendment.122 In-
deed, two hundred years of constitutional governance may not
have been possible without this judicially created flexibility. 123 In
short, I suggest that the World Trade Organization adopt this ex-
ception not as a retreat from legalism, but rather as an enhance-
ment and acknowledgment of its more legalistic dispute resolution
system. 24
3.3. Use of the Exception to Circumvent Trade Liberalization
Professor Shell's remaining criticism of the proposed exception
is that it "would encourage domestic protectionist groups to me-
ticulously draft domestic laws favoring domestic industries to give
these laws an appearance of being 'primarily' directed at a legiti-
mate 'underlying societal value."' 25 This argument often arises
against proposals to balance nontrade issues against trade issues:
proposals to deal with the environment, labor, and even corruption
have been attacked as actual or possible guises for protectionist ac-
tivity.126
121 For example, businesses and policymakers can make better predictions
about how the World Trade Organization will act, and thus can make more effec-
tive decisions concerning their future actions.
122 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 868 (1994).
123 See generally Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1943) (discussing the need for law to flex to accommodate societal interests).
124 Once again, the differences in theoretical perspective between Professor
Shell and myself must be emphasized. Professor Shell would cure the perceived
ills of the World Trade Organization by admitting into the process the "real" ac-
tors in international relations, who would then achieve the desired results. I, on
the other hand, suggest that the regime itself be changed in order to both survive
and to yield the optimal results.
125 Shell, supra note 3, at 379. Shell deserves credit for avoiding the trap of
arguing that countries would enact protectionist legislation; he remains true to the
mettle of liberalism.
126 See, e.g., Frances Williams, Labour Rights Plea to WTO, FIN. TIMEs, June 12,
1996, at 7 ("Many developing countries, especially in Asia, fear discussion of la-
bour standards in the WTO would serve as a pretext for the use of trade sanctions
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Because Professor Shell fails to explain why he finds the safe-
guard I suggest to be neither "persuasive [nor] principled," 127 I can
only briefly repeat it. Placing a real burden of proof on the party
claiming the exception would preclude parties from claiming socie-
tal values where none existed. 128 Shell also contends that an inter-
national tribunal is incapable of discerning societal values. 29 To
the contrary, discerning values is commonplace in international
tribunals, including those that were convened under the GATT.1
30
4. CONCLUSION
The World Trade Organization will engender debate for many
years. Although the debate between Richard Shell, Steve Charno-
vitz, and myself could be characterized as one concerning standing
and participation, an equally valid and critical point of contention
is whether the membership or the form of the organization has
more bearing on its functioning. Shell and Charnovitz present ex-
cellent and convincing cases for membership as an important as-
pect of the World Trade Organization. In doing so, however, I fear
that they slight the importance of form and the nature of the inter-
national trade regime.
Steve Charnovitz bases his justifications for interest group par-
ticipation in policymaking on an argument concerning standing.
Unfortunately, that argument structure leads his justifications
away from the form of the World Trade Organization, and thus
away from fundamental issues. Similarly, by adopting a liberal
aimed at removing their cheap-labour advantage.").
127 Shell, supra note 3, at 379.
128 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 301-02. In other words, the party that brought
the complaint would not be required to prove or disprove the existence of societal
values; instead, the burden rests with the party defending its actions to prove the
existence of a societal value and that its actions reflected that value. See Daniel R.
Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1989)
(suggesting that inquiry into intent in the United States works "by allocating bur-
dens of proof between the individual and the state"). International tribunals have
much experience at discerning values. See infra note 130. It would be very diffi-
cult for a protectionist government to fabricate societal values out of whole cloth.
129 See Shell, supra note 3, at 379.
130 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 301 n.35 (citing Norway, Restrictions on Im-
ports of Apples and Pears, June 22, 1989, GATT BISD 36th Supp. 306, 321 (1990)).
In determining whether custom is a binding source of international law, tribunals
must determine whether a customary behavior is considered obligatory. The
sources used in the determination are similar, if not identical, to those used to de-
termine societal values. See Nichols, supra note 12, at 717.
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perspective that emphasizes actors over form, Professor Shell
blinds his analysis to the possibility that organizations of nations
may be viable, and thus he too unnecessarily restricts the scope of
his analysis. In this essay, I supply a perspective that is missing
from both Charnovitz's and Shell's arguments. Simply put, I pro-
vide an institutional counterweight to their membership argu-
ments.
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